Thymos

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Summary
Thumos, cognate with Indo-European words meaning 'smoke', is one of a number of terms in Greek which associate psychological activity with air and breath. In the Homeric poems, *thumos* is one of a family of terms that are associated with internal psychological process of thought, emotion, volition, and motivation. Though the range of the term's applications in Homer is very wide, that range in itself gives us a sense of the unity of cognitive, affective, and desiderative processes in Homeric psychology. No post-Homeric author can rival the range of the Homeric presentation of *thumos*, but something of the richness of the Homeric conception of *thumos* as an interrelated set of motivations re-emerges in Plato's conception of the tripartite soul in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*. Plato's *thumos* represents a pared-down model of human agency typified by one central desire or aim in life, but also exhibiting whatever further capacities of persons are necessary to enable it to pursue that aim in interaction with the other elements of the personality. As in Homer, the metaphorical agency of Plato's *thumos* does not detract from the notion of the individual as the real centre of agency. Plato's conception of *thumos*, in turn, is a fundamental point of reference for Aristotle's treatment of *thumos* as a type of desire (*orexis*). Though Aristotle tends more generally to use the term as a synonym for *orgê* (anger), there are also traces of older associations between *thumos* and qualities such as assertiveness and goodwill towards others.

Keywords
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Essay
Thumos, cognate with Indo-European words meaning 'smoke' (including Latin *fumus*),[1] is one of a number of terms in Greek which associate psychological activity with air and breath.[2] One of these is *psuchê* (conventionally 'soul'), cognate with words meaning 'cold' and associated in the Homeric poems especially with the passage from life to death. *Thumos*, by contrast, suggests heat rather than cold: in Plato's *Cratylus* (419e) Socrates derives the term from *thuein* (to rage), a verb which not all would associate with the connotation of 'smoke' found in its homophone *thuein*, to offer burnt sacrifice, or in *thumian*, to fumigate,[3] but he also glosses it in terms of the 'boiling' (*zesis*) of the *psuchê,* and *zesis* is recurrent in descriptions of the phenomenology of *thumos*.[4]

Homer
A link between *thumos* and breath is clear in the Homeric poems: dying warriors breath out their *thumos* on the Iliadic battlefield (4. 522–4, 13. 653–4); the *thumos* of the dying horse, Pedasus, is breathed out and flies off at *Iliad* 16. 468–9,[5] and at 3. 293–4 sacrificial animals lie gasping on the ground, short of *thumos*, after the sacrificial knife has removed their *menos* or vital force.[6] In many passages, the *thumos* leaves or is lost in death (23x *Iliad*, 6x *Odyssey*), just as the killer (or cause of death) can be said to have removed one's *thumos* (25x *Iliad*, 9x *Odyssey*). Here, the behaviour of the *thumos* is comparable to that of the *psuchê*, which likewise leaves the body on death or in a death-like swoon, and indeed both *thumos* and *psuchê* can leave the body together in a single passage, both in death (*Il.* 11. 334) and in

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a swoon (as when Sarpedon's *psuchê* leaves him and he gasps out his *thumos*, but is revived by a blast of wind, *Il*. 5. 696–8). In other cases, however, it is the *psuchê* that is breathed out or departs in a swoon, while the *thumos* is breathed back in,[7] which perhaps reflects an association of *psuchê* with the life that one will lose and of *thumos* with the vigour of life as it is lived.[8] A straightforward identification of *thumos* with breath is complicated by its assimilation to the heart as something that can 'beat' in the chest (*Il*. 7. 216, 23. 370–1).[9]

The functions of *thumos* in Homer, however, extend far beyond living and breathing. By metonymy (in which aspects of the physical body felt to play a role in mental functioning come to serve as ways of referring to those functions) and in various forms of metaphor (chiefly reification and personification), Homeric *thumos* is implicated in a wide range of mental functions. But it is not the only such entity: a variety of other parts of the body, including the heart (*kradiê* and *êtor*) and the *phrenes*, are also credited with mental functions. For an older tradition of scholarship, the existence of these 'psychic organs' illustrates the primitiveness of Homeric concepts of self and agency. For Bruno Snell, the explanation of mental process in terms of the promptings of *thumos,* other organs, and the gods makes Homeric man 'a battleground of arbitrary forces and uncanny powers'; 'Homeric man has not yet awakened to the fact that he possesses in his own soul the source of his powers'.[10] Arthur Adkins follows Snell in maintaining that 'Homeric Man … has a psychology and a physiology in which the parts are more evident than the whole'.[11]

More recent scholarship has made such approaches untenable. First, it has been shown that in a large number of occurrences, when used adverbially (with a preposition, in the instrumental dative, or in some other analogous use of an oblique case, e.g. ἐν(ὶ) θυμῷ, κατὰ θυμόν, θυμῷ, etc.), the usage of the words denoting the so-called 'psychic organs' can be less a matter of semantic specificity than of metrical convenience, so that these terms exhibit substantial degrees of overlap and redundancy, as in the recurrent pleonasm κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν ('in *phrên* and in *thumos*').[12] We need to treat the 'psychic organs' as a family rather than as independent variables. But this does not mean that expressions that deploy these terms are wholly devoid of meaning: even at their most interchangeable, these locutions tell us *something* about the character of the experiences involved; in many cases the terms in question convey a more substantial and pointed sense of the interiority, intensity, and phenomenology of psychological processes.[13] *Thumos* is by far the most common member of the group, occurring over 750 times in the poems, roughly twice as often as *phrên*/*phrenes*. Though its range in Homer is very wide, it gives a sense of the particularity of the poems' representations of the phenomenology of mind and especially of the unity of cognitive, affective, and desiderative processes.

The most basic function of *thumos* in Homer is to highlight the inwardness of mental processes.[14] States of mind that are not expressed in behaviour can be said to be 'hidden in the *thumos*' (*Od*. 18. 406–7); just so, Odysseus commands Eurycleia not to cry out in celebration of the Suitors' deaths, but to 'rejoice in [her] *thumos*' (*Od*. 22. 411), and he himself pities Penelope in his *thumos*, with no visible tears or audible sobs (*Od*. 19. 209–11). Such interiority can also be conveyed by referring to the body language of the personified *thumos* (e.g. its smile, *Od*. 20. 300–2, its shiver, 23. 215–16).[15]

As an instrument, locus, or agent of thought and feeling, the *thumos* covers a wide range of cognitive, affective, desiderative, and motivational states.[16] Its motivational force is apparent in derivatives such as *athumia* (despondency, first at *Od*. 10. 463, frequent in post-Homeric Greek) and *prothumia* (eagerness, *Il*. 2. 588; ditto), and is reflected in numerous Homeric passages, especially those in which the *thumos* is said to urge the agent on or to issue commands for the agent to follow. [17] Wishing and wanting regularly take place in or by means of the *thumos* or are predicated of the *thumos* as personified agent (cf. the post-Homeric *epithumia*, desire): there is no functional difference between the two forms of

expression.[18] The *thumos* is the source of sexual desire (as when Demeter gives in to her *thumos* and has sex with Iasion, *Od*. 5. 125–7),[19] but is also associated with appetites for food and drink,[20] and with pleasures of all kinds.[21] To say 'restrain your *thumos* from x' is to say 'resist your desire to do x' (*Od*. 20. 266–7). Food and drink restore *thumos* to the chest (*Il*. 10. 460–1), allowing renewed physical effort. It is *thumos* that allows one to endure,[22] though it can be worn down by physical exertion (*Il*. 17. 744–5). That *thumos* provides the psychological component or physical effort is clear from *Il*. 17. 451, where Zeus places *menos* in both the knees and the *thumos* of Achilles' horses. When Achilles wryly observes that Aeneas will have no *thumos* to face him in future, he is saying that he will have (as we might say) no stomach to do so (*Il*. 20. 349–50).

Often the *thumos* is associated with especially strong or urgent forms of motivation. The *thumos* itself can be said to be 'eager' for a certain outcome.[23] In *Iliad* 24, Priam describes his strong desire to enter the Achaean camp and ransom his son's body as a powerful command of *menos* and *thumos* (24. 198–9). Hecuba agrees that it is *thumos* that drives him (24. 288–9), but this can also be expressed as a matter of his own strong desire, in his *thumos*, to ransom Hector (24. 236). The agency of the *thumos* does not detract from the agency of the person. The association between *menos* and *thumos* as motivating forces is a common one (*Il*. 17. 451 again).[24] The verbs μέμονα and μενεαίνω/μενοινάω, to be furiously eager, are cognate with *menos* and often occur in conjunction with *thumos*.[25] This association with strong, passionate motivation is present in the phrase, 'to love someone ἐκ θυμοῦ', which means something like 'with all one's heart' (*Il*. 9. 343, 486).[26] It also suggests that in the sole occurrence of the locution ἀπειλήσω τό γε θυμῷ at *Il.* 15. 212 the threat is especially vehement.

The association of *thumos* with motivation and determination is reflected also in phrases such as 'with equal *thumos*' or 'with one *thumos*', which connote goal-directed striving in pursuit of a common purpose.[27] We might say 'of one mind', but the Homeric phrases remind us that these mental states encompass volition and affect as well as intentionality and cognition. In a similar sense, *thumos* can be the source of what we might call 'spirit' or 'character': in a simile in *Iliad* 16, the wolves to whom the Myrmidons are compared go to drink, after a kill, 'and the *thumos* in their breasts is untrembling (162–3).[28] Similarly, it is Priam's 'iron *thumos*' that gives him the courage to face Achilles (*Il.* 22. 357).[29] But *thumos* is responsible for more characteristics than just courage or manliness. The *thumos* of the Suitors, according to Penelope, may be deduced from their outrageous behaviour (*Od.* 4. 694–5), while for Athena at 15. 20 the *thumos* of a woman is such that, on remarriage, she is liable to forget about her deceased husband and his children. A person's typical qualities can also be predicated of his or her *thumos*, be it excessive, violent, and cruel,[30] pitiless,[31] sceptical,[32] or god-fearing.[33] Jonathan Shay goes too far in asserting that in Homer *thumos* is 'a synonym for the English word "character"',[34] but 'character' would often be a perfectly good translation.

In post-Homeric Greek, *thumos* is a regular word for 'anger', sometimes also for its dispositional basis ('spiritedness'), and sometimes for especially vehement forms of anger ('fury').[35] In Homer, it is associated with a much wider range of emotions,[36] though anger, in all its Homeric forms, does loom large: *cholos*, *kotos* (a more persistent, dispositional form), and *nemesis* (righteous indignation) occur in the *thumos*;[37] one can *chôesthai* in the *thumos*;[38] and anger terms such as *kotos* and *nemesis* can be predicated of the *thumos* as a personified agent.[39] In *Iliad* 2, Odysseus, rallying both leaders and commoners, reminds the former that the anger (*cholos*) of someone such as Agamemnon can be harmful, because the *thumos* of kings is great (195–6) – *thumos* is the general psychic force of which *cholos* is a function.[40] On occasion, *thumos* and anger can come to the same thing: at *Il.* 1. 191–2, Achilles considers whether to kill Agamemnon or 'put a stop to his *cholos* and restrain his *thumos*'. In

the same way, Achilles' anger is the focus of Ajax's appeal in *Iliad* 9, when he urges him to accept compensation, as does the relative of a homicide victim 'whose *kradiê* and manly *thumos* are restrained' (9. 634–9); and Achilles himself concludes his reflections on the evils of anger with the resolution to make all this a thing of the past, taming the *thumos* in his breast (18. 112–3).[41]

Vying with anger as *thumos*' prototypical emotional association are various forms of grief, sorrow, distress, and worry:[42] famously, Odysseus in his wanderings suffered many pains in his *thumos* (*Od*. 1. 4), and similar expressions abound in both poems.[43] Another substantial cluster of passages associates *thumos* with fear;[44] it is likewise associated with similar emotions such as foreboding,[45] awe, and respect.[46] Similarly, the *thumos* can (in the *Odyssey*) be the seat of wonder,[47] or (in the *Iliad*) a container for the *aidôs* (shame, self-respect) that should prevent warriors slacking in battle (*Il.* 15. 561, 661).

As Ajax's appeal to Achilles in *Iliad* 9 shows, though the *thumos* gives rise to anger, it can also be associated with anger's abatement,[48] and in fact *thumos* is regularly found in connection with forms of benevolence. Friendly feeling is a recurrent function,[49] and one's friends are regularly described or addressed as dear to one's *thumos*, bringing joy to the *thumos*, and so on.[50] Thus *thumos* is associated with positive and pleasant emotions that bring individuals together, as well as with those that involve an element of pain or create distance between people. In a substantial number of passages, *thumos* is associated with feelings of joy and good cheer: the Trojans rejoice, and the *thumos* in the *phrenes* of each is melted, as they see the eagle of Zeus which bodes well for Priam's mission to recover Hector's body (*Il.* 24. 320–1).[51] Similar is the simile that describes the softening of Menelaus' *thumos*, following Antilochus' apology, at *Il* 23. 597–600:

> His *thumos* melted, like dew on the ears of a crop as it grows, when the fields bristle; that's how the *thumos* in your *phrenes* melted, Menelaus.

Similarly affiliative, but potentially more distressing, is the emotion of pity.[52] Its power and complexity are apparent in *Iliad* 24 (466–7), where Hermes advises Priam to appeal to Achilles on behalf of his father, mother, and son as a means of stirring up his *thumos*. Here, stirring up the *thumos* involves creating the circumstances in which the addressee realizes, on the basis of his own affective familial ties, that another person is similarly situated and affected. The physical nature of the arousal that this can entail is apparent also in Odysseus' encounter with his father, Laertes, in *Odyssey* 24, where the old man's ritual gestures of mourning, prompted by the belief that his son is lost, provide the catalyst for the latter's revelation of his true identity (318–19):

> His *thumos* was stirred, and bitter *menos* now surged all through his nostrils as he beheld his father.

Stirring up the *thumos* is a general way of referring to this arousal, in connection with a range of emotions.[53] These passages indicate how *thumos* can refer to emotions with both powerful physical symptoms and substantial interpersonal, social, and cognitive dimensions.

Thumos thus stands in a variety of subtle and complex relations to both cognition and affectivity. Its association with the impairment of judgement is apparent in cases which present *atê* (disastrous delusion) as one of its experiences:[54] *atê* affects one's judgement, but it also has a strong affective aspect in that it typically involves kinds of arousal that lead one to do things one later regrets.[55] The *thumos* can also be enchanted or deceived:[56] *Od*. 18. 281–3, where Odysseus rejoices as Penelope's words bewitch the *thumos* of the Suitors, is a good example of how such enchantment works not only on the patients' intellect, but on their

desires and emotions. Similarly straddling the cognitive/affective divide, and often equally delusionary, is *elpis*, both when it has the desiderative element that qualifies it to be regarded as hope and when it denotes mere expectation.[57]

Both hope and expectation require the capacity to think about hypothetical states of affairs; the same is true of many of the emotional, desiderative, and motivational applications of the term *thumos* that we have considered so far. But an application to imagination as such appears also in a passage such as *Od*. 20. 92–4, where Odysseus hears his wife's sobs and – in his *thumos* – imagines her standing beside him and recognizing him for who he is:

> Noble Odysseus heard her voice as she wept, and then he pondered, and it seemed to him in his *thumos* (δόκησε δέ οἱ κατὰ θυμὸν) that she had already recognized him and was standing by his head.

Again, *thumos* is the location of an undetectable psychological experience, one that takes place within the individual, depends on the body and its powers of perception, encompasses an element of desire or longing, and is clearly not without substantial emotional implications.[58]

The association of *thumos* with delusion, deception, wishful thinking, and imagination chimes with its function as the object of persuasion.[59] Persuasion and its failure depend on the appeal that the speech makes to the emotional susceptibility of the recipient, and not just on the capacity to advance or accept an argument on 'purely rational' terms. Similarly, phrases such as φίλον ἔπλετο θυμῷ (4 x *Il.*, 4 x *Od.*) or κέρδιον ἔπλετο θυμῷ (*Od*. 20. 304)[60] express forms of choice, preference, and decision that (as a matter of fact, according to modern neuroscience) cannot take place without the motivating force of affectivity.[61] Accordingly, in locutions in which knowledge is a function of the *thumos* we often have an element of emotional commitment: at *Od*. 18. 227–9, Telemachus' reference to what he 'thinks and knows' in his *thumos* is not about propositional knowledge at all, but about the development of his character,[62] especially in moral terms, and his determination to put his knowledge of right and wrong into practice:

> Mother, I do not resent your anger; but I understand it all in my *thumos* (θυμῷ νοέω καὶ οἶδα ἕκαστα), right and wrong, though before I was immature.

Though 'knowing x in one's *thumos*' may sometimes mean only that knowledge is an internal mental state, there is often a further implication that the knowledge in question is something that one should 'take to heart' as a matter of conviction.[63]

Since *thumos* can be associated in various ways with what later Greeks would call *phantasia* (i.e. the imaginative representation of objects, experiences, and scenarios that are in principle accessible but not immediately present to the senses, whether in itself or as a component in other processes, such as emotion), it is no surprise that it is also associated with memory, as when Zeus is reminded κατὰ θυμόν of the fate of Aegisthus at *Od*. 1. 29 and Odysseus remembers Tiresias' warning to avoid the island of Helios at 12. 266–7. Tiresias' warning 'falls into' Odysseus' *thumos*, an instance of the recurrent container metaphor that makes *thumos* the place where thinking is done and specific thoughts are located. To have an idea is to put or receive an item in one's *thumos*. It cannot be denied that in some cases such thoughts are primarily a matter of knowledge, belief, or practical reasoning: both Athena-Mentes and Helen confidently prophesy events as the gods put them in their *thumos* (*Od.* 1. 200–1 = 15. 172–3) and a god's putting a thought in a person's *thumos* is used in explanation both of Eurycleia's recognition of Odysseus and Odysseus' own knowledge of further trials to come (*Od*. 19. 485 = 23. 260). In the lying tale that the disguised Odysseus tells Eumaeus,

Odysseus at Troy conceives a plan (*noos*) 'in his *thumos*' to obtain a cloak for his shivering comrade (*Od*. 14. 490). But it is also striking how rarely the thoughts that the *thumos* contains can be said to be completely free of affective colouring: in the case of Odysseus' recalling of Tiresias' prophecy (*Od*. 12. 266–7), the memory is tinged with apprehension and foreboding as the lowing of the sun god's cattle reminds the hero of the dangers of ignoring the warning. Similarly, the thoughts 'in her *thumos*' that Antinous attributes to Penelope at *Od*. 2. 116 involve her confidence in her skill as a weaver of wiles as well as of textiles, and when Penelope herself places her son's wise words in her *thumos* (*Od.* 1. 360-1 = 21. 354–5) the process involves the emotional effect that Telemachus' speeches have on her, both in their general impression (she 'takes them to heart') and in terms of her amazement (1. 360 = 21. 354) at his growing assertiveness. Putting a particular notion in one's *thumos* can imply hope (e.g. *Il*. 10. 447, 20. 195–6), caution (e.g. *Od*. 12. 217–18, 15. 27), or *aidôs* (*Il*. 15. 561, 565–6); Antinous' ignorance of his fate, no thought of death in his *thumos* (*Od.* 22. 11-12), also entails unjustified confidence. Even Nestor's advice to Antilochus on the need for cunning in the chariot race at *Il.* 23. 313-14 ('put *mêtis* in your *thumos*') is inflected by its association with competitive striving.

The pattern is similar when it comes to the association of *thumos* with planning and deliberation. The *thumos* is the locus of intelligence and problem-solving at *Od.* 12. 57–8, where Circe prefaces her description of the Planktai, Scylla, and Charybdis (55–110) with the injunction that Odysseus must figure out a course for himself (αὐτὸς θυμῷ βουλεύειν). Eumaeus' advice to Telemachus, that he should take care, *thumos*-wise, because there are many among the Achaeans who mean him harm (*Od.*17. 595–6), implies the same capacities of intelligence and planning, but encompasses the affective aspect of caution as well. That the *thumos* in such circumstances involves both the mental processing of sensory information and the formulation of plans for action in the light of such deliberation is wonderfully clear from the passage in *Iliad* 16 in which Zeus, following the death of his son, Sarpedon, looks down on the battlefield and ponders whether to have Hector kill Patroclus immediately or only after the latter has achieved further successes (646–55):

> He kept looking at them and reflected *thumos*-wise (φράζετο θυμῷ), pondering (μερμηρίζων) hard over the killing of Patroclus, whether … As he was thinking in these terms, it seemed better to him (ὧδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι) that Achilles' goodly squire should push the Trojans and bronze-helmed Hector back to the city once more and take the *thumos* from many.

As Zeus looks, he processes internally (θυμῷ) the information he perceives, but this processing also involves the evaluation of present circumstances in the light of a long-term plan that is now potentially subject to a degree of modification as a result of Zeus' emotional response to Sarpedon's death. *Thumos* regularly has this association with difficult choices and the weighing up of alternatives; the forms of intelligence that it encompasses are thoroughly tied to action and the affective dimensions of its motivation.[64]

Stuck in the cave of Polyphemus, whose *thumos* is without pity (*Od.* 9. 272, 287) and who illustrates his readiness to disregard Zeus' wrath and kill suppliants, should his *thumos* so command (278), by killing and eating two of Odysseus' companions, Odysseus has at first no immediate plan of action: helplessness grips his *thumos* (295). But once the monster has finished his meal, Odysseus' first thought is of violent revenge: he plans in his proud *thumos* to approach the Cyclops and kill him (9. 299-302). But another *thumos* restrains him (ἕτερος δέ με θυμὸς ἔρυκεν, 302): if he kills Polyphemus, they have no way of getting out of the cave. We have seen that thoughts arise or are placed in the *thumos* and that the personified *thumos* itself can have thoughts and feelings of various different kinds. *Thumos* also has a

role in deliberation, often in difficult, emotionally pressing circumstances. Here, however, one *thumos* confronts another. This is not a scandalous proliferation of psychological agents, testifying to the absence of a unified concept of the person, but a metonymy: *thumos* here means 'thought' or 'impulse', not as process (the process in which *thumos* is normally implicated as agent, instrument, or location), but as product. That impulse, however, is also personified as the subject of ἔρυκεν. One impulse is more impulsive than the other, but not only are the impulse to take revenge and the better judgement that restrains that impulse equally 'a *thumos*', but each *thumos* also has indissoluble cognitive and affective aspects. Each evaluates a situation, imagines a possible future, and provides a basis for action. The ἕτερος θυμός inhibits a hot-headed, passionate course of action, but as well as prudent, longer-term planning, it also involves a projection of future states of affairs that encompasses a strong desire to survive.

The *thumos* is implicated in various other ways in the phenomenon of 'being in two minds'. In two passages of the *Iliad*, following similes that exploit its fundamentally metaphorical character by comparing mental disturbance to the action of the winds,[65] the *thumos* is itself divided (ἐδαΐζετο θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν Ἀχαιῶν, *Il.* 9. 8, 15. 629), while at 14. 20 it is Nestor himself who is divided, *thumos*-wise (δαϊζόμενος κατὰ θυμὸν διχθάδια). These are clearly interchangeable ways of talking about the same phenomenon. Nor is the self-division that these passages present simply a matter of weighing up alternatives; the division of the *thumos* involves the kind of emotional turmoil that can also be expressed in terms of movement, as when Penelope's '*thumos* is aroused in two ways, this way and that' (*Od*. 19. 524), whether to remain with Telemachus and faithful to her husband or to marry one of the Suitors (526–9), or when Philoetius tells the disguised Odysseus of the dilemma that the *thumos* in his chest constantly 'churns over' (ἐπιδινεῖται, *Od*. 20. 217-18), whether to abandon Telemachus or to stay and suffer as the Suitors despoil his master's herds, 218–21). The concrete physicality of these metaphors enhances the phenomenological aspect inherent in the conceptualization of *thumos*. But these internal movements also have propositional content; the conceptualization of the *thumos* (by means of metonymy and metaphor) captures the intentionality as well as the phenomenality of the mental processes that it explains.

In all these passages, the *thumos* is implicated in deliberation between alternatives, a very common scenario in the Homeric representation of mental phenomena. Deliberation is something that the *thumos* itself can do,[66] but more often it is something that a person does, with or without explicit reference to the *thumos*.[67] At *Il.* 13. 455–9 it is Deiphobus himself who 'ponders in two ways', whether to do x or y, before deciding to pursue an instance of x:[68]

> Deiphobus pondered in two ways (διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν), whether he should withdraw and team up with one of the great-hearted Trojans, or make an attempt on his own. As he was considering the matter in this way it seemed better to him (ὧδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι) to go after Aeneas …

Here there is no explicit reference to *thumos*, *phrenes*, or the like. This does not mean that we should conclude that one can deliberate without using one's *thumos* (etc.); merely that deliberation is ordinarily an activity carried out by an agent him- or herself, and that, when the mode of doing so is specified (*via* an adverbial phrase involving the *thumos*), this adds little or nothing to the meaning – the adverbial reference to a 'psychic organ' merely specifies that deliberation is a process that takes place within the mental apparatus of the person. The agent owns the process; the reasons for each alternative are the agent's reasons. What reference to the *thumos* can add (at least sometimes, and especially in circumstances of

greatest stress or pressure) is a sense of the phenomenology of deliberation as a subjective experience.

In the passage just considered, the intentionality and propositional content of the agent's deliberations is clear. The same is true when the person deliberates (e.g.) κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν and when the *thumos* itself deliberates: there are typically two alternatives, expressed in propositional terms (whether to do x or y); sometimes there is also a conclusion in the form of a decision to do what 'seemed better', which is equally propositional.[69] Thus the content of deliberation is at least implicitly discursive – it lends itself to formulation in terms of speech. Accordingly, at *Od*. 6. 117–26, Odysseus' deliberation, on being awoken by the sound of Nausicaa and her companions playing ball, is expressed not by indirect deliberative questions (whether he should do x or y, how to do z), but by direct speech:

> Noble Odysseus woke up. He sat down and began to ponder in his *phrên* and in his *thumos*, 'Ah me, who are the people whose land I have come to this time? … But come – let me put it to the test myself and see.'

This passage is followed by a concluding speech formula (ὣς εἰπών, 127), but it is not clear, and probably not all that important, whether we are to regard lines 119–26 as silent, internal speech, or as spoken out loud. The cases of deliberation that involve indirect questions show that deliberation can be silent; those in which the relevant verbs are followed by direct speech might be regarded as representing inner thought as silent speech or as using actual speech as a convention for representing the contents of the agent's thoughts.[70] The important thing for our purposes is that these *are* clearly the agent's thoughts.

In a subcategory of deliberation scenes, the agent's deliberation is followed by direct speech that is described in the narrator's speech-introduction formula as an address to the *thumos*. These speeches are attributed either to humans, using the formula 'vexed, he said to his great-hearted *thumos*' (7x *Iliad*, 4x *Odyssey*), or to gods, with 'shaking his head he said to his *thumos*' (2x each poem). As Pelliccia demonstrates, these are all speeches which either have no addressee or audience or have no audience and an addressee who is not meant to hear.[71] The *thumos* is a sounding-board for the agent's thoughts, expressed as direct speech; the two cases in *Odyssey* 5 in which the supposed address to the *thumos* is recapitulated in a regular deliberation formula, with the person as subject ('while he was pondering these things in his *phrên* and in his *thumo*s'), make this especially clear.[72]

In a smaller sub-set of these speeches, the speech which the narrator introduces as an address to the *thumos* contains the line 'But why has my dear *thumos* said this to me in conversation?'[73] The question, however, is unanswered; it serves only as the conclusion of the ruminations that were introduced by the narrator as an address to the *thumos.*[74] Yet these speeches are not addressed to the *thumos* by their speakers: in fact, they all begin 'Ah me' (ὤ μοι ἐγώ(ν)). Just as the *thumos* is not actually addressed, so no actual speech is attributed to it: the *thumos* simply performs two conventional functions, first as sounding board for the speaker's deliberations, then as a convenient scapegoat as source of the rejected alternative.[75] In the longest of these passages, Hector's monologue in *Il*. 22. 98–130, it is clear that the apparent 'dialogue' with the *thumos* represents Hector's emotional turmoil (ὀχθήσας, 98) as he reflects on the situation he finds himself in: he has ignored Polydamas' advice to retire within the walls (99–103, a reference to 18. 249–313) and so has ruined his people through his own recklessness (104) – a self-condemnation that is reflected also in the charges that he expects others to level against him (105–7). Hector is fully aware that he will have to answer in future for his previous decisions. He then considers his options in the present, contemplating an attempt to reach an accommodation with Achilles (111–21). But this, he realizes, is a futile fantasy (122-30):

> ‘But why has my dear *thumos* said this to me in conversation? If I approach him, he won’t pity me or show me respect – he’ll kill me, naked as I am, just like a woman, if I remove my armour … Better to join battle as soon as possible: let’s see to which of us the Olympian grants the boast of victory.’

Hector, therefore, addresses himself; blames himself for his previous decisions; weighs his options; and comes eventually to a decision that, given his past mistakes and his present circumstances, he regards as ‘better’ for him. That he is said by the narrator to speak all these words to his *thumos*, and then rejects a course of action that he himself entertained (sketching out what he might do in five first-person verbs and a further two nominative participles) by describing it as a proposal of his *thumos*, in no way detracts from his own sense of agency and responsibility, and it should not detract from our sense of him as a responsible human agent either.

Many of the above points emerge clearly in a highly individual passage of *Odyssey* 20. [76] Odysseus lies sleepless in the ante-chamber of his own house, plotting harm for the Suitors in his *thumos* (5), when the laughter of his female servants, who sleep with the Suitors, stirs up the *thumos* in his chest (9): the *thumos* exhibits its regular associations with future planning, silent, internal thought, emotion, and arousal. As is typical, the role of the *thumos* has both intentional and phenomenal aspects – it involves thoughts about events in the world and a representation of what it feels like to have those thoughts for the agent. Internal, silent, but still emotionally charged deliberation continues, as Odysseus ponders in his *phrên* and in his *thumos* (10) whether to kill the women on the spot or let them sleep with the Suitors one last time (10–13). ‘His heart within him barks’ (κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει, 13), a reference to the anger that disposes him towards an immediate and violent course of action: the doings of a physical organ stand in metonymy for the emotional experience with which the organ is associated. The organ in this case is the heart, even though it was the *thumos* that was aroused only four lines earlier – the ‘psychic organs’ are a family of terms among whom cognitive and affective functions are liberally shared. This is not an experience independent of the arousal of the *thumos*, but another way of referring to that experience, or to its intensification. The heart’s reaction also involves metaphor – it barks. That this is understood as metaphor, i.e. as a mapping from one domain (animal behaviour) to another (psychological experience), is made crystal-clear by the simile that follows – the heart barks like a female dog defending her pups (14–16).[77] At the same time, these are experiences of Odysseus as agent, and the thoughts are his thoughts – the heart barks, but he is the one who resents the women’s offences (ὥς ῥα τοῦ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει ἀγαιομένου κακὰ ἔργα, 16). In a (unique) variation upon the speech-introduction formula in which a character is said to address his *thumos*, Odysseus is then described as beating his breast and addressing his *kradiê* (17). In an even more striking variation, the ‘psychic organ’ is then – here and here alone – actually addressed and spoken to, using second-person verbs (18–21):

> ‘Endure, heart: you’ve endured worse in the past, on that day when the irresistible force, the Cyclops, ate my strong companions. But you endured, until *mêtis* led you out of the cave, though you thought you were going to die.’

This takes personification of the *kradiê* further than personification of the *thumos* is ever taken. [78] But still, though the heart is addressed, it does not itself speak. But after Odysseus has ‘restrained the dear heart [*êtor*] in his chest’ (22), the *kradiê* does obey and endure (23–4). There appear to be two interlocutors, even if one of them merely listens and obeys. But the lines in which Odysseus reminds the *kradiê* of its past (18–21) show that this is so only

by means of a poetic conceit. This is clear not only because the experiences of the heart are transparently those of Odysseus himself, and not only because the personified *mêtis* in line 20 is itself also, like the heart, an avatar of Odysseus, a reference to the way in which he outwitted the Cyclops by calling himself Outis and the pun by which this becomes μή τις (~ *mêtis*) at 9. 410. The persistence of Odysseus as operative agent, despite the personification of *kradiê* and *mêtis*, is also clearly demonstrated by ὀϊόμενον in 21, which betrays the fact that all this is Odysseus' way of addressing himself. The participle agrees in sense with σε, the heart, in 20: 'you', the heart, endured, and μῆτις led 'you' out of the cave, but the thought of imminent death is in effect attributed to the only agent on the scene who is capable of being qualified by a masculine participle, Odysseus himself.[79] The tenor, Odysseus, intrudes into the vehicle of the metaphor, in which his own thought processes are represented by personifications.[80]

The personification of the barking heart is singular and striking. It emphasizes the phenomenology of Odysseus' experience and conveys it vividly and effectively to the audience. It heightens the tension of the situation in which Odysseus is, for a moment, tempted to jeopardize his long-term plan by giving way to a powerful impulse for revenge. But though its metaphors of self-division dramatize vividly the process of deliberation and impulse control, they also leave Odysseus, the real agent, in control throughout. Even though it focuses on the *kradiê*, the passage is also directly informative about the functions of the *thumos*. There is a unity that underpins the shifts – in the passage and in its immediate context – between Odysseus, his *thumos*, and his *kradiê*. The reflections of Odysseus himself in 5 and 9-13 involve *thumos* in its regular adverbial function (ἐνὶ θυμῷ, 5; κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, 10), amplifying, more or less tautologously, the interiority of mental events. The *thumos* is then itself aroused in 9, before this is represented as the indignation of the *kradiê* in 13–21. These are stages of a single mental process. Just as there is no functional difference between *thumos* in 9 and *kradiê* in 13–21, so the address to the *kradiê* in 18–21 is immediately summarized as a rebuke to the *êtor* in 22.[81] The heart, once again called *kradiê*, obeys in the next line, but Odysseus himself tosses and turns, deliberating (μερμηρίζων) how to obtain his revenge (28–30). But after Athena appears in the guise of a mortal woman and reminds him how close to his goals he is (30–5), the very same process of deliberation is attributed to the *thumos* (37-43):[82]

> 'Yes, all you have said, goddess, is in order; but the *thumos* in my *phrenes* ponders (μερμηρίζει) this one thing, how I can get my hands on the shameless Suitors, alone as I am; they are always together indoors. Besides, there is this yet greater thing I ponder (μερμηρίζω) in my *phrenes*: if I were to kill them, by Zeus' grace and yours, where could I escape to? I bid you think on that.'

Throughout, the reflections and motivations that this passage represents, whether attributed to Odysseus, his *thumos*, or his *kradiê*, are those of Odysseus himself; just so, the deliberations of the *thumos* in 38 are assimilated to those of Odysseus himself in 41.[83] The *thumos* becomes a 'psychic organ' by metonymy; by the ontological metaphor of personification, it is then credited with a variety of cognitive and affective functions and occasionally used to dramatize situations of deliberation, self-division, and self-control; but these remain ways of representing the personal agency of Homeric characters.

One thing that is characteristic of the passages that we have considered so far is that the various uses of *thumos*, whether as a personified agent, as a reified container for thoughts and emotions, or in locutions which specify modes of thought and emotion, are rarely without a sense of the motivational strength of the impulse in question. The impulses that the *thumos* helps represent can be wholly in harmony with the agent's plans and goals, but the *thumos*

may also be in conflict with them. The *thumos* can be a container for one's plans or it can be the place where overwhelming emotions develop. It itself can be the restraining force that subjugates short-term emotional satisfaction to long-term goals, though it is more often a force that rational agents need to control. The *thumos* itself can be divided over what to do, but often the agent and the *thumos* are partners in deliberation. Interaction between the person and the *thumos* is represented in more than one way. The *thumos* represents a spectrum of functions. Nor is it alone in this: the other 'psychic organs' also operate across this spectrum. But *thumos* is the dominant, prototypical, and most versatile example among them. In none of this is there any reason to question the coherence of the *thumos* as a concept or to conclude that this coherence detracts from that of the Homeric conception of the person as agent. It is not that *thumos* is now affective or irrational in character, and now not; rather it reflects a view in which cognition and affectivity are intrinsically linked as aspects of a person's inner life, moral character, and ways of being in the world. As an internal substance, space, entity, or agent associated with processes of cognition, affectivity, volition, and motivation, the *thumos* is not a scandalous miscellany of capacities that should be kept separate, but a concept that links 'reason' and 'passion', mind and body, intentional and phenomenal in ways that implicitly recognize the unity of cognition and affectivity as functions of an organism whose mental functions are fundamentally and thoroughly embodied.

Plato

The post-Homeric conception of *thumos* does not have the richness of its Homeric counterpart. Homeric idioms survive (e.g. *thumos* – probably desire or anger – as an opponent in a struggle at Heraclitus B 85 DK, echoed in Democritus B 236 DK;[84] as an agent-like source of motivation in Parmenides B 1. 1 DK; as an addressee in *Selbstgespräch*, Archilochus 128 W), but though it remains associated with desire and with other emotions and dispositions,[85] its association with anger comes to predominate, all the way to Byzantine and modern Greek (though traces of a wider range of senses survive in compounds such as the Byzantine *enthumizein*, to remember, *thumoterpês,* delighting the heart, etc.). Something of the richness of the Homeric conception of *thumos* as an interrelated set of motivations, however, re-emerges in Plato's conception of the tripartite soul in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus.*

In the *Republic*, the division of the *psuchê* is established by means of the Principle of Opposites (436b–c, 436e–437a, 439b), that the same subject cannot do or suffer the same thing in the same respect with regard to the same object at the same time: thus when one wants to drink, but believes that it is better not to do so, a reasoning part (*logos, to logistikon*) is opposed to appetite (*epithumia, to epithumêtikon*). Socrates then proceeds to consider whether *thumos*, i.e. that with which we feel anger or rage (θυμούμεθα), is aspect of the appetitive element or a third type (*eidos*) in its own right (439e). The distinctiveness of this type is then established by means of examples of its conflict with desire (Leontius' urge to look at corpses, 439e–440a) and with reason (illustrated at 441b–c by Odysseus' rebuke to his *kradiê* in *Odyssey* 20).[86] The *Odyssey* passage is so well known that Plato needs to quote only a single line (20. 17), for his readers to think of the whole context. In particular, though Plato quotes only the rebuke to the *kradiê*, he clearly takes the passage as evidence for the operation of the *thumos*. He treats the Homeric *thumos* as part of a wider system.

The Principle of Opposites can establish that there is more than one type of motivation, but it cannot prove that what conflicts with desire, in the case of Leontius, is not reason, or that what conflicts with reason, in the case of Odysseus, is not desire. The claim that the element opposed to desire in the first case and to reason in the second must be *thumos* relies instead on pre-existing intuitions about the phenomenological character of *thumos* itself. [87] Homer is one source of such intuitions, but the currency, in the ordinary

Greek of Plato's day, of *thumos* as a form of anger makes that emotion even more central in Plato's conception than in Homer's. Hence *thumos* is like a boiling liquid in a container (440c), [88] but also like an angry dog (440d); the difference between *thumos* and reason is illustrated by the fact that it is present also in furious infants (441a) and barking dogs (441b). The Auxiliaries of Kallipolis, Glaucon observes, are like dogs, under the command of the Guardians as shepherds of the state (440d).

But the anger that the *thumos* entails is not wholly irrational. Though the reference to Odysseus' barking heart (441b-c) is intended to distinguish between 'that which makes calculations about better and worse' and 'that which rages without reason', Odysseus' personified *kradiê* is not only capable of resenting a wrong, imagining a scenario that would right that wrong, and demanding that the wrong be redressed *immediately*, but is also susceptible to argument on the basis of past experience, and is thus credited with memory as well as with imagination. *Thumos* also encompasses the righteous indignation of someone who believes he has been treated unfairly, and so can involve a sense of justice (440c–d). While at 439e–400a, the anger of Leontius is self-directed, focusing on desires that he feels are shameful but is none the less unable to resist; his *thumos* makes the same judgement of his disreputable desires as does his reason (439e–440a). The link between these responses is the notion of honour.[89] In the later discussion of inferior regimes and character types, domination by the *thumoeides,* manifested in competitiveness and love of honour (*philonikia* and *philotimia*) characterizes both the timocratic regime (548c) and the corresponding individual (549a, 549d–550b). The *thumoeides*, being *philonikon* and *philotimon*, aims at power, victory, and reputation (581a–b). As in the *Republic* (440b, 441a), so in the *Phaedrus*, *thumos* can be reason's ally against desire: in that dialogue's myth of the soul as a charioteer and two horses, the good horse is a lover of honour with moderation (*sôphrosunê*) and modesty (*aidôs*, 253d–e, 254a, 254c, 254e), joining the charioteer in opposing the shamelessness (*anaideia*) of the bad horse (254d). But alignment of individuals' attachment to ideals of the honourable requires education if it is to support the aims of reason (*Resp.* 441a3 441e–442a, 589b). In Kallipolis, this will take the form of traditional education in *mousikê* (441e–442a), which inculcates a sense of what is *kalon* (beautiful, fine, honourable) and *aischron* (ugly, shameful, 400c–403e), though for the Guardians as opposed to the Auxiliaries, the rational faculty will require further education (522a–b). Much about this educational regime suggests that it will foster strong and deep-seated commitments to shared moral standards (396d–e, 402a, 413e, 429c, 442b–d), even though the sketch of timocratic society at 548b does suggest that its members will be tempted, focused on honour as they are, to do wrong in secret.[90]

The Principle of Opposites by which tripartition is introduced suggests that the true subjects of our desires for the good, the honourable, and the pleasant are the three elements of the *psuchê* (436b–c). For some, this is intended literally, and leaves no room for the agency of the person as a whole.[91] But from the first appearance of the tripartite model in Book 4 to the exuberant accounts of deviant character types in Books 8–9, the language in which the tripartite soul is described is fundamentally metaphorical. Thus anger can be at war with the desires (440a) and *thumos* can be reason's ally, as if they were taking part in civil strife against *epithumia* (440b; cf. 441a). *Thumos* can be unwilling to be roused when justly punished, but fight along with justice, suffering hunger and cold, holding out for victory until it either prevails, or dies, or is called back and calmed down, like a dog, by its owner (440c–d). Plato shows that he is aware of the centrality of metaphor to his account by the way that he ends the whole argument on the superiority of justice to injustice, an argument that relies on the tripartite model and which runs from Books 2 to 9 of the *Republic*, with an extravagant tour-de-force of metaphor, an image (*eikôn*) of the soul in words (588b; cf. 588d), that makes it a composite of three types (*ideai*): a many-headed beast, a lion, and a person, with the

external aspect (or image: *eikôn* again) of a person (588c–d). This is explicitly an *eikôn*: it tells us not what the soul is, but what it is like.[92] The passage is replete with metaphors, many of them recalling what has gone before. Thus, when the beast and the lion are strong and the human being weak, the latter is at their mercy, unable to reconcile the others but instead forced to let them bite, fight, and devour each other (588e-589a). Instead, the human being should be as strong as possible, and should, with the lion as his ally, look after the many-headed beast as a farmer cultivates his crops (589b). The bestial element should be under the control of the human and the tame should not be enslaved to the wild (589d), the best element of oneself to the worst (ibid.), or the most divine element to the most godless and vile (589e). The *psuchê* is thus a state or *politeia* in which elements interact like factions or classes of citizens (591e).

The use of personification means that the *thumos*, like the other two elements, cannot be narrowly defined in functional terms: as metaphorical agents they possess many, but not all, of the qualities that characterize a person. There is thus no question of deciding what capacities they 'really' represent or what they can 'really' do.[93] Plato's *thumos* is an entity that resembles Homer's, representing a type of motivation, a pared-down model of human agency typified by one central desire or aim in life, but also exhibiting whatever further capacities of persons are necessary to enable it to pursue that aim in interaction with the other elements of the personality. [94] As in Homer, the metaphorical agency of Plato's *thumos* does not detract from the notion of the individual as the real centre of agency. When Plato draws on the Homeric Odysseus' rebuke to his heart, he substitutes interaction between *thumos* and reason for the original interaction between a person (Odysseus) and his heart. This might suggest that, for Plato, a person and her reason are identical. This, for example, is how some scholars explain passages in which not only the three personified elements of the soul interact, but the person herself interacts with one or more of those elements.[95] But this will not work: there are passages that present a relationship between the agent and his *logistikon* that parallels precisely that between a person and his *thumos*, his *epithumêtikon*, or the desires to which the *epithumêtikon* gives rise.[96] There is a person over and above the elements of the tripartite model. The function of that model is to represent, metaphorically, the different varieties of motivation to which real persons are subject by presenting them as if they too were persons.

Though part of Plato's aim in doing this is to construct a working model of human motivation, a related aim is the protreptic one of encouraging people to act on the knowledge that the model provides by modifying the motivations that it represents.[97] We see this especially in the image of the triform creature with which the whole discussion concludes in Book 9: here, the interaction of the whole person with the three main elements of his or her personality is the ultimate point of the argument. At 588e, we are told that anyone who holds the mistaken belief that injustice is advantageous and justice disadvantageous is committed to the idea that it is better to feed and strengthen the beast and the lion, while starving and weakening the human being (588e–589a); i.e. it is *our* beliefs and *our* behaviour that determine the inter-relationships of our three internal agents. 'We' stand in a certain relationship not only to our desires, but to each of the three elements of our personality, including our inner *anthrôpos*. The conclusion to this section leaves no doubt that the cultivation and management of each of the three elements of the personality is something that the individual as such can and should choose to pursue (589d–591e). The ultimate point of the tripartite soul is to present an account of the kind of person that *we as individuals* should most aspire to become and of the conditions that conduce to or militate against such an outcome. That account presupposes the ability of individuals to order their personalities and change their lives. The explicit argument of the dialogue demonstrates that Plato had no intention to dispense with the agency of the person; the details of his imagery further

illustrate the persistence of a fundamental and robust background conception of personal agency. Like Homer's, Plato's conceptualization of the *thumos* is fundamentally metaphorical,[98] but neither Homer's nor Plato's conception of the person as a participant in intra-personal dialogue with a variety of internal agents leads to the dissolution of the person or to a proliferation of autonomous homunculi.

Aristotle

Aristotle's concept of the *psuchê* is a very different one from Plato's: though he does have his own notion of 'parts of this soul', he contrasts his biological approach with accounts of the *psuchê* that focus only on human behaviour (*DA* 402b3–5). For him, the 'parts of the soul' are logically but not spatially distinct; in the natural sciences, the distinction between them depends on capacities that define the differences between plants, animals, and humans as living creatures;[99] but in dialectical contexts (such as the *Ethics, Politics*, and *Rhetoric*), he does work with a popular distinction between a part which is *alogon* and one which 'has *logos*', though these, again, may be only logically distinct, like convex and concave in the circumference of a circle (*EN* 1102a26–32). Aristotle is also explicit about the metaphorical nature of language that attributes agency to the soul: it is 'perhaps better nor to say that the *psuchê* feels pity or learns or thinks, but that the person does by means of the *psuchê*' (*DA* 408b13–15). That said, in dialectical contexts Aristotle is himself not averse to a degree of metaphor, and he does seek to accommodate aspects of Plato's moral psychology, including aspects of his account of *thumos*.

In his dialectical accounts of human behaviour, Aristotle generally prefers bipartition to tripartition. But even when he distinguishes between rational and non-rational forms of motivation, he remains clear that speaking of conflict between these, in terms which one ordinarily uses of interpersonal interaction, is metaphorical (*EN* 5, 1138b5–13):

> By metaphor and analogy there is a sort of justice, not towards oneself but between certain aspects of oneself – not justice in the full sense of the term, but of the sort that exists between master and slave or within the household. For it is in these terms that the part of the soul that has reason is distinct from the irrational; it is when one looks to these parts that injustice towards oneself seems to exist, because in these it is possible to undergo an experience that is contrary to their desires; therefore there can be a sort of justice between them, as between ruler and subject.

Similarly, though he rejects the Platonic tripartite *psuchê*, Aristotle retains a threefold classification of desire, *orexis* – as *boulêsis* (rational desire for the good), *thumos,* and *epithumia* (desire for the pleasures of food, drink, and sex – that is clearly inspired by the Platonic model of the soul, each element of which, Aristotle himself notes, involves desire (*DA* 432b6–7).[100] On occasion, however, Aristotle's distinction between 'that which has *logos*' and the *alogon* is at odds with the threefold classification – as at *Politics* 1287a28–32, where the rule of law is described as the rule of the divine and the intellect (*nous*) alone, whereas the rule of a human being imports also the bestial, represented by *epithumia* and *thumos*, which can corrupt even the best rulers; which is why law is *nous* without *orexis*.[101]

One major reason for this conception of *thumos* as a type of desire is the role of desire in Aristotle's account of anger: *orgê* is a desire to return pain for pain, as the *De anima* puts it (*DA* 403a30–1),[102] or for redress (restoration of honour, *timôria*), according to the *Rhetoric* (1378a30). Aristotle often uses *orgê* and *thumos* interchangeably;[103] often, too, it is clear from the context that *thumos* refers to the occurrent emotion of anger (as when *thumos* is included in lists of *pathê* or otherwise described as a *pathos*).[104] Sometimes, however, there is a suspicion that *thumos* implies something more dispositional than occurrent anger, and on

occasion it can emerge as more like a trait of character. Thus at *Rhet.* 1389a9–12, the young are *thumikoi* and *oxuthumoi,* tend 'to follow anger (*orgê*)', and 'are overcome by *thumos*': though *thumikos, oxuthumos*, and 'being overcome by *thumos*' here are all defined with reference to anger and its inability to bear insults or injustice,[105] still 'following anger' and 'being overcome by *thumos*' may not be *exactly* the same thing, and references to youthful *philotimiai* and *philonikia* suggest something of the positive desire for honour and victory that characterized the *thumos* of Plato's *Republic.*

The role of *thumos* in character and temperament has, for Aristotle, physiological underpinnings: the natural scientist's definition of *orgê* at *DA* 403a31-b1 – the boiling (*zesis*) of blood and hot stuff around the heart' – is given by the (pseudo-Aristotelian, but none the less Peripatetic) *Problemata* as a definition of *thumos* (869a5–6), and the physical constitution of bodies that facilitates retention and build-up of heat provides in several passages the basis for *thumos* as a characteristic of both animals and humans, together with references to the symptomatology and phenomenology of *thumos* and similar or contrasting phenomena.[106] The 'noble *thumos*' that develops in those birds whose bodies are drier and leaner (*GA* 749b33) is clearly not anger as such, but a dispositional trait that might give rise to anger. In a passage of *Politics* 7 (reflecting a form of environmental determinism found in sources such as the Hippocratic *Airs, Waters, Places*) those peoples that inhabit cold regions and the periphery of Europe are said to be 'full of *thumos*', but lacking in intellect and skill, while Asiatics have intellect and skill, but lack *thumos*; the Greeks occupy the intermediate position, having both *thumos* and intelligence (*Pol.* 1327b23–36). Here, *thumos* may imply emotion, but refers to a capacity, like intellect or technical skill: the same diversity obtains within Greece (b33–6), some Greek *ethnê* being characterized by *thumos*, some by intellect, and some being 'well blended in respect of both these capacities' (*dunameis*, b36), Characteristic of *thumos* here is the determination to remain free and independent (b25, 28–9, 31): 'in all cases the ruling element and the element that prizes freedom derive from this *dunamis*; for *thumos* is a ruling and indomitable thing' (1328a6–7).[107] Here, at least, the *orexis* that *thumos* entails is not merely anger's desire for retaliation.[108]

The physiological basis for this ethnography is explained in the *Problemata*: people in hot regions are cowardly while those in cold regions are brave, because the bodies of the former are loose in texture, so that they lose heat, while the flesh of the latter is denser because of their cold environment, with the result that they retain more heat (910a38–b8). Accordingly, the ethical treatises identify a natural form of bravery (*andreia*), found in animals as well as humans, and characteristic of barbarians such as the Celts; this resembles the true form, but differs because it is rooted in the emotion of *thumos* rather than in choice of the noble for its own sake.[109] The association of *thumos* with the painful emotion of anger and its desire for the pleasure of *timôria* is also to the fore in the discussion (in *EN* 7) of the possibility that there may be a form of *akrasia* (failure of self-control) with respect to *thumos*:[110] *akrasia* in the strict sense applies only to the appetites (*epithumiai*) that are covered by the moral virtue of *sôphrosynê*, but analogous phenomena are discernible in failure to control one's anger, a failure that is less reprehensible than *akrasia* proper. In a passage whose use of personification is redolent of Plato, *thumos* is said to listen to, but to mishear the voice of reason (1149a25–6), like servants who rush to carry out a command before understanding it or dogs who bark before they know who's there (a26–9); on account of its hot and hasty nature, *thumos* hears something, but does not recognize it as an order, and rushes in pursuit of *timôria* (a30–2), reasoning that the insult that reason has identified requires an immediate response (a32–4). Because *thumos* follows reason in this way, as *epithumia* does not, *akrasia* in the strict sense (i.e. with regard to *epithumia*) is worse than *akrasia* with regard to *thumos* (1149b1–3). *Thumos* is also better than *epithumia* in so far as it

is spontaneous, whereas *epithumia* can be devious – 'the person characterized by *thumos* is not a plotter, nor is *thumos*' (b14).

Anger is thus more central to Aristotle's conception of *thumos* than it is to Homer's or Plato's, but there are signs that *thumos* also denotes a capacity with a wider range of expressions. In the *Eudemian Ethics*' discussion of the virtue of *praotês*, the mean between being too irascible and not irascible enough (*EE* 1231b5–26), it is clear that this 'mildness', no less than anger itself, depends on *thumos*, even though the term *thumos* is used only with reference to the painful emotion on which all these dispositions focus (b6–7, 11, 15).[111] This is perhaps one explanation for the slightly puzzling sequel to the passage in *Politics* 7 already mentioned. Having discussed *thumos* as the *dunamis* that makes nations resist domination by others (*Pol*. 1327b23–36), Aristotle goes on to observe that those whom a lawgiver would lead towards virtue should be both intelligent and *thumoeideis* (1327b36–8). This then prompts him to consider the view put forward in Plato's *Republic*, that the Auxiliaries should be friendly to those they know and savage towards those they don't (b38–40). This is a view that Aristotle rejects (1328a8–16), but the important point for our purposes is that part of his argument rests on the claim that *thumos* is the source of friendliness, indeed the capacity (*dunamis*) by means of which we love our friends and relatives (1327b40-1328a1). This is supported by the argument that 'the *thumos* is aroused more towards associates and friends than towards strangers, if it thinks that it has been slighted' (1328a1–3). This is a strange argument, but behind it may lie not only the considerations adduced by Newman (that dogs are *thumikos,* friendly, and fawning, or that opposite phenomena, such as *orgê* and *philia*, should be located in the same category),[112] or the association between *thumos* and *praotês* mentioned above, but also longer-standing, traditional associations, such as we find in Homer, between *thumos* and states of mind that we might regard as anger's opposites, such as friendly feeling and the willingness to be reconciled.[113] Yet, though *thumos* in Aristotle may imply a disposition for self-assertiveness, manly courage, and competitiveness (on the one hand), as well as for gentleness and friendliness (on the other), we have seen nothing that would warrant Koziak's more sweeping claims that the *orexis* that *thumos* represents is the 'desire … for a good social relationship' or that *thumos* is Aristotle's 'name for the locus of emotional capacity'.[114]

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Notes

[1] See Beekes, Robert. *Etymological Dictionary of Greek*. Leiden: Brill, 2009, 564.
[2] See Onians, Robert Broxton. *The Origins of European Thought.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn1954, 44–6, 49–56, 67–79; Bremmer, Jan. *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983*,* 56; Pelliccia, Hayden. *Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1995*,* 59; Clarke, Michael. *Flesh and Spirit in the Songs of Homer*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 130–3.
[3] See Chantraine, Pierre*. Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue Grecque*. Paris: Klincksieck, 1968–80, 446.
[4] Cf. Eur. *Hec.* 1055, Soph. *OC* 434, Pl. *Resp.* 440c, *Tim.* 70b.
[5] Breathed out: cf. *Od*. 5. 468; flies off: cf. *Od*. 10. 163, 19. 454.
[6] For the loss of *menos* and *thumos* in death, cf. *Il*. 8. 368.
[7] *Il*. 22. 466–75, *Od.* 24. 345–50. For 'gathering one's *thumos*' (etc.) as getting one's breath back, cf. *Il*. 21. 417, *Od*. 5. 458.
[8] So Clarke, *Flesh and Spirit*, 140–3.
[9] The *thumos* is often located in the *phrên/phrenes*: passages in Jahn, Thomas. *Zum Wortfeld 'Seele-Geist' in der Sprache Homers*. Munich: Beck, 1987, 14–15. Some identify these with the lungs (Onians, *Origins*, 23–43). But the anatomical reference is uncertain: see (e.g.) Sullivan, Shirley Darcus. *Psychological Activity in Homer: A Study of Phrên*. Ottowa: Carleton University Press, 1988. 23–9. For the concentric arrangement of the 'psychic organs' within the chest, see Jahn 17–18.
[10] Snell, Bruno. *The Discovery of the Mind.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1953, 19-22 (quotations pp. 21-2).
[11] Adkins, Arthur. *From the Many to the One.* London: Constable, 1970, 15-27 (quotation p. 26). Similar views are encouraged by the 'laundry list' approach to Homeric psychology, in which (in themselves useful) lists of different functions are merely set side by side: see especially Caswell, Caroline. *A Study of Thumos in Early Greek Epic.* Leiden: Brill, 1990; Sullivan, Shirley Darcus. *Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What Early Greeks Say.* Leiden: Brill, 1995.
[12] See Jahn *'Seele-Geist'*, esp. 182-211; the table on 186–92 shows at a glance that most of the functions of *thumos* we shall consider below are not functions of *thumos* alone. For κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν as pleonastic, see p. 210.
[13] Jahn, *'Seele-Geist'*, 212-46.
[14] See Jahn, '*Seele-Geist*', 7–8, 107–8, 210–15, 225–32.
[15] Because phrases such as κατὰ θυμόν/κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν regularly mark internal mental processes, it is tempting to regard prayers delivered κατὰ θυμόν as silent (*Il*. 23. 768–9, *Od*. 5. 444), as indeed ancient and Byzantine scholarship did (Richardson, Nicholas. *The Iliad: A Commentary* vi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993, 255). This is perhaps complicated by the facts (a) that in the former case the addressee is said to hear the prayer (*Il.* 23. 771) and (b) that in each case the prayer is followed by the formula 'so he spoke' (*Il*. 23. 771, *Od*. 5. 451), but silent prayer (a phenomenon securely attested by *Il*. 7. 194–5) remains the most likely interpretation (see Jahn, '*Seele-Geist*', 214; Pelliccia, *Mind, Body, and Speech*, 131–2). For speeches addressed to the *thumos*, see below.
[16] Caswell *Thumos*, 12–50, 65–76 has a taxonomy, but the schematic representation in Jahn, '*Seele-Geist*', 20–3, is more useful in that besides functions (emotional, rational, and voluntative), it also lists modes of representation (as agent, as object, etc.).
[17] References in Caswell, *Thumos*, 47–9, 73–6; Pelliccia, *Mind, Body, and Speech*, 55–7, 59, 78, 100–3.
[18] *Il.* 9. 177 etc. (12x *Il.*), *Od*. 1. 275 etc. (9x *Od.*).
[19] Cf. *Il.* 3. 139–40, *Od* 18. 160–1, 212.
[20] (food), *Il*. 1. 468, 2. 431, *Od.* 5. 95 etc. (6x *Od*.); (drink) *Il.* 4. 263, 7. 320, 9. 177, *Od.* 3. 395 etc. (6x *Od.*); (both) *Il*. 23. 56, *Od*. 7. 184 etc. (5x *Od*.).
[21] Including sex, *Od*. 23. 345–6, but also playing the lyre, *Il*. 9. 189, and a host of others (*Il*. 15. 98 etc., *Od.* 1. 107 etc.).
[22] *Il*. 5. 670 etc. (5x *Il.*), *Od*. 4. 447 etc. (11x *Od.*).
[23] E.g. *Il.* 1. 173, 6. 361, 9. 42, 9. 398.
[24] Cf. *Il*. 16. 529 etc, *Od*. 1. 320–1 etc. A person's *menos* and *thumos* can stir him to action (*Il.* 20. 174), just as *menos* and *thumos* themselves can be stirred up by another's speech (*Il.* 5. 470 etc., *Od*. 8. 15).
[25] *Il.* 5. 135 etc. (6x *Il.*), *Od.* 2. 248.
[26] Cf. the more frequent κηρόθι μᾶλλον (2x *Il.*, 7x *Od.*).
[27] See *Il*. 13. 487–8 etc. (6x *Il.*), *Od*. 3. 127–9; cf. *Il*. 22. 263 (the *thumos* of wolves is not of one mind with that of lambs). 'With *thumos* asunder' accordingly indicates the absence of common purpose (*Il*. 20. 32, 21. 386).

[28] At *Il*. 22. 66–71 Priam imagines his own dogs, restless in *thumos*, drinking his blood after he has been killed in the sack of Troy.
[29] Cf. *Od*. 2. 314–16, where the growth of Telemachus' *thumos* will no longer permit him to sit by and watch as the Suitors consume his inheritance. Just so, the disguised Odysseus tells Telemachus that, if he had the youth to match his current *thumos*, he'd soon put a stop to the Suitors' abuses (16. 99–104). Shortly after, Telemachus himself assures his father that his own *thumos* is up to the task ahead of them (16. 309–10; cf. 24. 511). Cf. also such later passages as Soph. *El.* 26 and Xen. *Cyr*. 4.2.21, where *thumos* virtually means 'courage'.
[30] *Il*. 15. 94, 18. 262, *Od*. 15. 212, 23. 97, 23. 230; cf. *Il*. 23. 610–11 (*not* violent and cruel).
[31] *Od*. 9. 272, 287.
[32] *Od*. 14. 150, 391.
[33] *Od*. 19. 364.
[34] Shay, Jonathan. 'Killing Rage: *Physis* or *Nomos* – or Both?' in H. van Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*. London: Classical Press of Wales, 33; cf. Sullivan, *Psychological and Ethical Ideas*, 56–7.
[35] See e.g. Hdt. 1. 137. 1, Eur. *Med.* 1079, Ar. *Vesp*. 567, Thuc. 2. 11. 7, Soph. *OC* 1193, Isoc.12. 81. For the distinction between mere anger (*orgê*), which is natural, and fury or rage (*thumos*), which is not, see Philodemus, *De ira*, columns XLIII.41–XLVI.14 Indelli.
[36] A list of passages at Caswell, 65–73, discussion at 34–44.
[37] *Cholos* 8x *Il*, 1x *Od*.; *kotos* 2x *Il*., 2x *Od*.; *nemesis* 2x *Il*., 2x *Od*. But NB also *cholos* and *kradiê*, *Il.* 9. 646; *cholos* and *êtor Il.* 10. 107, 14. 367; both, 24. 584–5; *cholos* and *kêr, Il.* 21. 136, *Od*. 9. 480, 17. 458, 18. 387, 22. 224; *cholos* and *phrenes Il*. 16. 61, *Od*. 6. 147; *nemesis* and *phrenes Il*. 13. 122–3; *chôesthai* and *kêr* (ὸ δ' ἐχώσατο κηρόθι μᾶλλον) *Od*. 5. 284, *chôesthai* and *phrenes* (*Il*. 19. 127).
[38] *Il.* 1. 243–4, 429, 4. 495, 16. 616, 20. 29; cf. *kotos* and *chôesthai* at *Il*. 21. 456–7 and *Od*. 11. 102–3. At *Il.* 9. 462–3, the *thumos* is the source of Phoenix's father's anger (*chôesthai*).
[39] *Kotos* in the formula κεκοτηότι θυμῷ (*Il.* 21. 456, *Od.* 9. 501, 19. 71, 22. 477); *nemesis* at *Od*. 2. 138; cf. also 'lest your *thumos* be indignant (ἐπισκύσσαιτο)' at *Od*. 7. 306; 'but as for those two, their manly hearts were angry (ἀγάσσατο)', *Od*. 4. 658.
[40] Cf. Onians, *Origins*, 52, 87.
[41] Repeated verbatim at 19. 65–6, in the context of Achilles' formal renunciation of his quarrel with Agamemnon. Cf. Odysseus' request that the dead Ajax 'tame [his] *menos* and manly *thumos*', *Od*. 11. 562. Restraining one's *thumos,* however, does not always imply anger; at *Od*. 11. 105 it involves resisting the temptation to eat the cattle of the sun.
[42] Anger and grief overlap in Homer, especially in the form of *achos* (e.g. *Il*. 23. 566–7 θυμὸν ἀχεύων as anger, 22. 53, 242 as grief), but also in other locutions (such as θυμῷ ἀνιάζων, of frustration/annoyance at *Il*. 21. 270, but of lamentation at *Od*. 22. 88). Cf. Cairns, Douglas. Ethics, 'Ethology, Terminology: Iliadic Anger and the Cross-Cultural Study of Emotion', in S. M. Braund and G. W. Most (eds) *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 29–30.
[43] Grief/anguish/distress, e.g. *Il*. 3. 97–8 and often, *Od*. 2. 192–3 and often; sorrow/dismay, *Il*. 11. 555, 17. 664, 24. 283, *Od*. 16. 342; cares (*meledêmata/kêdea*), *Il.* 23. 62, *Od.* 4. 650 and often; mental pain, *Il.* 5. 400 etc., *Od*. 2. 79, 4. 813.
[44] *Il*. 8. 138 etc. (11x *Il.*), *Od*. 7. 50–1 etc. (5x *Od*.). At *Il.* 17. 67–9, the advent of fear entails lack of confidence in the personified *thumos*; at 17. 18–23 its confidence entails the absence of fear.
[45] *Od*. 18. 154, 19. 390; cf. (with *thumos* as subject) 20. 349. At *Od.* 10. 374, the phrase κακὰ δ' ὄσσετο θυμός is normally taken to mean 'my *thumos* boded ill' (in the context of Odysseus' refusal of Circe's hospitality), but at *Il.* 1. 105 κακ' ὀσσόμενος refers to Agamemnon's angry, malevolent scowl (cf. 24. 172, where the contrast with ἀγαθὰ φρονέουσα in 172 makes it clear that κακὸν ὀσσομένη refers, by metonymy, to ill-will), and so it is not impossible that our phrase in *Od*. 10. 374 is another example of the metaphorical transfer of the outward, physical expression of emotion to the undetectable inner experience of the personified *thumos*; cf. *Od.* 20. 301-2, 23. 215–16 cited at n. 15.
[46] For *sebas* (awe/respect), see *Il*. 6. 167, 18. 178.
[47] *Od.* 1. 323 etc. (8x).
[48] E.g. *Il*. 19. 178, 24. 119, 147, 176, 196.
[49] E.g. in phrases such as φίλα φρονέησ'/φρονέουσ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ, *Od*. 6. 313, 7. 42, 75 (the opposite at 10. 317).
[50] E.g. κεχαρισμένε θυμῷ at *Il*. 5. 243 etc., *Od.* 4. 71; φίλος ἔπλετο θυμῷ at *Il*. 23. 548; Ἕκτορ ἐμῷ θυμῷ πάντων πολὺ φίλτατε παίδων, 24. 748 (cf. Helen at 762); κεχάριστο δὲ θυμῷ, *Od*. 6. 23; περὶ γάρ μ' ἐφίλει καὶ κήδετο θυμῷ, *Od.* 14. 146.
[51] Cf. *Il*. 7. 189 etc. (8x *Il.*), *Od*. 1. 311 (14 x *Od*.).
[52] See *Il*. 19. 229, 22. 142; *Od*. 5. 191, 11. 55, 87, 206, 395.
[53] E.g. *Il*. 24. 568 (anger rooted in grief); *Od*. 14. 360, 15. 486–7, 17. 150, 21. 86–7 (reminding someone of their troubles; see also 19. 117-18). As *Od*. 18. 160–1 shows the *thumos* can also be aroused in sexual desire.
[54] *Il*. 9. 537, 11. 340, *Od*. 21. 302, 23. 223–4.

[55] See Cairns, Douglas. '*Atê* in the Homeric Poems', *Papers of the Langford International Latin Seminar* 15 (2012): 1–52.
[56] Enchanted: *Il*. 15. 321–2, 594; cf. erotic enchantment at *Od*. 18. 212; deceived: e.g. *Od*. 4. 452–3.
[57] Hope: *Il*. 10. 355 etc. (8x *Il*.), *Od*. 20. 328 (3x *Od*.); expectation: *Il.* 13. 8 (3x *Il*.). *Od*. 3. 275 and 319 are ambiguous.
[58] Similarly, at *Od*. 10. 415–16, Odysseus' companions are so glad to see him that their *thumos* imagined that they had actually reached their homeland of Ithaca.
[59] See *Il*. 6. 51 etc. (5x *Il*.), *Od*. 7. 258 etc. (5x *Od*.).
[60] Cf. ὣς γάρ νύ τοι εὖαδε θυμῷ, *Od*. 16. 28; ἦδε δέ οἱ/μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή (3x *Il*., 3x *Od*.).
[61] See e.g. Damasio, Antonio. *Descartes' Error*. New York: Putnam, 1994.
[62] Cf. e.g. *Il*. 4. 360–1. On the dispositional 'knowledge' involved in such passages, see Cairns, Douglas. *Aidôs*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, 128–9.
[63] E.g. the strongly emotional affirmation 'For I know this well κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν that there will be a day when holy Ilion, and Priam, and his people are destroyed' (Agamemnon, *Il*. 4. 163–5, Hector, 6. 447–9). At *Od*. 22. 372–4, the 'knowledge' that the herald, Medon, is to take from his experience of being spared by Odysseus and Telemachus (ὄφρα γνῷς κατὰ θυμόν) is clearly a matter of 'learning his lesson' in a sense that is much more than purely intellectual. Cf. *Od.* 2. 111–12, 13. 339–40.
[64] Cf. e.g. *Od*. 16. 235–9, where Odysseus enquires how many Suitors there are, in order that he can ponder in his *thumos* and decide whether he and Telemachus should face them alone or seek reinforcements. Less is at stake in Pisistratus' dilemma in Book 15 – he has only to weigh up his obligations to Telemachus, who does not wish to be held up by Nestor's hospitality, against the risk of offending his father; but still 'giving thought in his *thumos*' (202) involves rapid evaluation of possible alternatives before adopting the course of action that 'seems better'(204) in so far as it meets the obligations of friendship (203) and discounts the old man's θυμὸς ὑπέρβιος (212) as something to be dealt with later.
[65] See further Caswell, *Thumos*, 50–63.
[66] As (e.g.) when Telemachus describes the very dilemma that Penelope will go on to present in terms of the 'arousal' of her *thumos* (*Od*. 19. 524) as something that 'her *thumos* ponders in two ways' (*Od*. 16. 73); cf. 20. 38, where Odysseus' *thumos* ponders how to defeat the Suitors.
[67] With the *thumos*: see e.g. the variations on the formula μερμήριξε δ' ἔπειτα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν (2x *Il*., 4x *Od*.); other expressions with *mermêrizein* (*Od*. 10. 50, 16. 237); variations on the formula ἦος ὃ ταῦθ' ὥρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν (4x *Il*., 4x *Od*.); other expressions with *hormainein* (3x *Il*., *Od*. 2. 156); cf. Caswell, *Thumos,* 45–7, 73. For passages in which the person simply 'ponders', without mention of the *thumos* (or other 'psychic organ), see *Il.* 10. 28 etc. *Od*. 2. 325 etc. In *Il*. 14. 159–61 and *Od*. 20. 93 the person does not initially deliberate κατὰ θυμόν, but subsequent reference to the *thumos* suggests (what we might in any case suppose) that the involvement of the *thumos* (or another 'organ') can often be assumed; deliberation also makes use of the *phrenes* alone (*Il.* 2. 3 etc. (4 x *Il*.), *Od*. 1. 427 etc. (9x *Od.*)), and occasionally also of other 'psychic organs' (*êtor*, *Il.* 1. 188–9, *kêr*, *Od*. 7. 82–3, 18. 344–5, 23. 85–6). See Jahn, '*Seele-Geist*', 273–85, 291–3.
[68] For the same pattern, cf. *Od*. 6. 141–6, 18. 90–4.
[69] The relevant formulae are used both in cases in which the agent deliberates whether to do x or y and where the issue is how to do x; on these, see Pelliccia, *Mind, Body, and Speech,* 126–7. Here we concentrate on the former.
[70] For the issues here, see Pelliccia, *Mind, Body, and Speech*, 128–35, 182–99.
[71] Pelliccia, *Mind, Body, and Speech*, 121–3, 136–46, 200–3, 212–13, and passim; cf. Gill, Christopher. *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, 58, 187.
[72] *Od*. 5. 365 (picking up 355) and 424 (picking up 407). For Sullivan, on the other hand (*Psychological and Ethical Ideas*, 58, 69), it is addresses to the *thumos* above all that 'emphasize the distinctness of person and *thumos*'.
[73] *Il*. 11. 407, 17. 97, 21. 562, 22. 122: ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός;
[74] Cf. the sole occurrence of the phrase in a speech that is not so introduced, at *Il*. 22. 385 (with Pelliccia [] 205).
[75] See Pelliccia, *Mind, Body, and Speech*, 203–11, 267. On the 'self-distancing' that this represents, cf. Gill, *Personality,* 187–8.
[76] Cf. Halliwell, Stephen. 'Traditional Greek Conceptions of Character', in C. B. R. Pelling (ed.), *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, 38–42; Pelliccia, *Mind, Body, and Speech,* 175–8, 220-4; Gill, *Personality*, 183–90.
[77] A conscious and knowing approach to the use of such imagery is also suggested by the pun, κύντερον ('more dog-like', i.e. worse), in 18. Cf. *Od.* 19. 204–7: in a common metaphor for grief, love, etc., Penelope's cheeks 'melt' (τήκετο, 204, 208) in a way that is compared to melting snow on a mountain (205–7). The amplification by means of a simile indicates deliberate, artistic use of metaphorical concepts.
[78] See Pelliccia, *Mind, Body, and Speech,* 175–6, 178; Gill, *Personality,* 184.

[79] As Eustathius acutely noted (*Comm. Od.* 2. 223 Stallbaum on 20. 18). Cf. Halliwell, 'Character', 40 n. 9; Pelliccia, *Mind, Body, and Speech,* 223 n. 203.
[80] For 'intrusion', see Silk, Michael. *Interaction in Poetic Imagery*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974, 138–49 and *passim.*
[81] Cf. Pelliccia, *Mind, Body, and Speech,* 177 n. 123, with Jahn, *'Seele-Geist'*, 201–9, on *Austauschbarkeit*. Similarly, κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν forms a single adverbial expression, pleonastically modifying μερμήριζε in 10.
[82] Thus the passage combines two conventional objects of deliberation, whether to do x or y and how to do what one has decided to do; see Pelliccia, *Mind, Body, and Speech,* 220-3; Gill, *Personality,* 184.
[83] See Pelliccia, *Mind, Body, and Speech*, 222.
[84] Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1315a27–31 (and again at *EE* 1223b22–4, *EN* 1105a8).
[85] Courage/manliness: Tyrt. 10. 17 W, Call. 1. 1 W, Pi. *N*. 3. 58; grief/sorrow: Thgn. 1029–36, Bacchyl. 1. 179, Pi. *I*. 8. 52, Emped. B 145 DK; joy: Sem. 7. 70 W, Pi. *O*. 7. 43, *I*. 7. 2, Bacchyl. 3. 83–4; character in general: Pi. *N*. 7. 10, 11. 32, Bacchyl. 17. 82.
[86] On the Homeric inspiration for the role of the *thumos* in the *Republic,* see Pelliccia, *Mind, Body, and Speech,* 28–9 n. 38; Gill, *Personality,* 184, 188, 253; Renaut, Olivier. *Platon: La mediation des émotions*. Paris: Vrin, 2014, *passim*, esp. 121–34.
[87] See Annas, Julia. *An Introduction to Plato's Republic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981, 127–9, 137–41; Price, Anthony W. *Mental Conflict.* London: Routledge, 1995. 56–7, 61–3, 68–70.
[88] On *zesis*, boiling, as a *thumos*-metaphor, see n. 4.
[89] Cairns, *Aidôs*, 381–92.
[90] Cf. Cairns, *Aidôs*, 387–9.
[91] Bobonich, Christopher. *Plato's Utopia Recast*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, esp. 217–22, 248–51. For Bobonich (p. 228), 'Plato's commitment to agent-like parts of the soul pervades the *Republic* and he never suggests that such talk is intended as a metaphor or as a convenient way of speaking and not as a literal truth claim.'
[92] Cf. *Phdr*. 246a, 256b–c on the chariot myth.
[93] As do Lorenz, Hendrik. *The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, 2, 16, 34, 48–9; Moss, Jessica. 'Appearances and Calculations: Plato's Division of the Soul.' *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 34 (2008): 35–68.
[94] See Moline, Jon. 'Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche.' *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 60 (1978): 1-26; Annas, *An Introduction,* 131, 142–6; Cooper, John. 'Plato's Theory of Human Motivation.' *History of Phililosophy Quarterly* 1 (1984): 3–21.
[95] See e.g. 443d-e, 550a-b, 553b-d, 571d-572a, 591e, 606a, with Irwin, Terence *Plato's Ethics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 285–7. For Bobonich, *Plato's Utopia Recast,* 234 and n. 27, these are simply cases of 'occasional loose language'.
[96] See 553d, 571d, 588e-589b, 589d.
[97] See Kamtekar, Rachana. 'Speaking with the Same Voice as Reason: Personification in Plato's Psychology.' *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 31 (2006): 167-202.
[98] Cf. Schofield, Malcolm. *Plato*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 280 n. 48: 'I conclude that Plato – always the dramatist of the theatre of the soul – has *no* non-metaphorical way of articulating his theory of mind.' Cf. 281 n. 59.
[99] See *DA* 402b1–10, 411a26–b30, 413b11–16, 29–414a3, 432a22–b7, 433b1–4, with Vander Waerdt, Paul. 'Aristotle's Criticism of Soul-Division.' *American Journal of Philology* 108 (1987): 637–43; Whiting, Jennifer. 'Locomotive Soul: The Parts of Soul in Aristotle's Scientific Works.' *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 22 (2002): 141–200; Corcilius, Klaus and Gregoric, Pavel. 'Separability *vs* Difference: Parts and Capacities of the Soul in Aristotle.' *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 39 (2010): 81–120; Johansen, Thomas. *The Powers of Aristotle's Soul*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 47–72, 247–51; Shields, Christopher. *Aristotle: De Anima*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 88–9, 161–2, 185–8, 191–2, 349, 361–2].
[100][100] See *DA* 414b2, *De Motu* 700b22, *EE* 1223a26–7, 1225b25, *EN* 1111b10–13, *Rhet*. 1369a2–7; cf. *De sensu* 436a6–11, *MM* 1187b36–7; cf. Polansky, Ronald. *Aristotle's De Anima: A Commentary*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 502–5; Shields, *De Anima*, 350.
[101] Cf. 1334b15–28, with Kraut, Richard. *Aristotle: Politics Books VII and VIII*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, 147–8; cf. e.g. *Probl.* 956b35–6.
[102] Cf. *Top.* 156a31–b4, 127b31–3.
[103] E.g. *EN* 1126a16, 19–21, 1135b25–7, *Rhet*. 1369b11–12, 1370b9–14, 1378b2–6, 1379a4. At *Rhet.* 1373b36 Aristotle promises a discussion of *thumos* 'in the account of the *pathê*'; when that account comes, the term used is *orgê* (1378a30ff.)
[104] *DA* 403a16–18 (cf. 403b18), *EE* 1220b11–12; cf. *EN* 1117a9, 1147a14–17 *EE* 1220a21.

[105] By contrast the old at 1390a11–12 are prone to sharp but less intense outbursts of *thumos,* while those in their prime are moderate in both *thumos* and *epithumia* (1390b2–4).
[106] See *HA* 588a23, *PA* 650b34–6, 651a1–2, *Probl.* 889a15–25, 898a4–8, 910a38–b8, 923a9–12, 947b23–948a12, 954a31–4.
[107] The phrase '*thumos* is an indomitable thing' occurs also at *EE* 1229a28 (see n. 109). At *EE* 1222b4 the deficiency that makes one too ready to come to terms and reconcile is said to be rare, because '*thumos* is not a sycophantic thing'. Cf. the *thumos* that characterizes men rather than women at *Physiog.* 809a36–7. It is their thumoeidic and warlike character that makes it unlikely, according to Aristotle, that Plato's Auxiliaries would have acquiesced in being ruled, but never ruling (*Pol.* 1264b8–10).
[108] This it is not quite right to say that, for Aristotle, *thumos*, unlike *boulêsis* and *epithumia*, 'seems to be explicable only with reference to a past event' (Nussbaum, Martha. *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978 336).
[109] See 1229a20–9, 1229b28–32, *EN* 1116b23–1117a9.
[110] *EN* 1145b19–20, 1147a14–17, 1147b29–34, 1148b10–14, 1149a24–b27; see Natali, Carlo. '*Nicomachean Ethics* VII. 5–6: Beastliness, Irascibility, and *Akrasia*' in C. Natali (ed.), *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, *Book VII*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 103–29.
[111] The equivalent discussion in *EN* mostly uses *orgê* (*EN* 1125b26, 30–1, 1126a3–4, 6–7, 13–20, 22, 1126b5–6, 10), but has *thumos* as a synonym at 1126a20–1.
[112] *HA* 488b21–2 and *Top.* 113a33–b3 resp.; see Newman, William L. *The Politics of Aristotle*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1887, iii. 367.
[113] For the former, see (e.g.) passages in which the friend is addressed as 'you who delight my *thumos*' (*Il*. 5. 243, *Od*. 4. 71, etc.) or those in which friendly feeling itself is a function of the *thumos* (*Od*. 6. 313, 7. 42, 14. 146); for the latter, see (e.g.) *Il*. 19. 178 ('let your *thumos* be reconciled'). Cf. the 'softening' of Achilles' *thumos* by gifts at *Il.* 24. 119, 147, 176, 196.
[114] Koziak, Barbara. *Retrieving Political Emotion:* Thumos, *Aristotle, and Gender*. University Park PA: Penn State Press, 2000 (quotations from pp. 96, 111).